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Abstract
The objective of the paper is to propose endogenous debt constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria
in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt con-
straints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment,
default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002), Kubler
and Schmedders (2003) and Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, indepen-
dently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the
existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model.
An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of
economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002)). This illustrates
the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.
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1. Introduction
One of the main difficulties of extending financial markets
economies to an infinite horizon is related to the existence of
the so-called Ponzi schemes. In the absence of a terminal date
agents would attempt to finance unbounded levels of consump-
tion by renewing their credit at infinite. If such schemes are
permitted, the agent’s decision problem has no solution. There-
fore, without debt constraints that limit the rate at which agents
accumulate debt, equilibria fail to exist.
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Broadly speaking three approaches have been proposed in
the literature to deal with the specification of debt constraints
in infinite horizon sequential markets models. The main dif-
ference among these lines of research hinges on the specific
assumptions made about the enforcement of payments as well
as the proposed default punishment.
The first approach, due to Magill and Quinzii (1994),
Herna´ndez and Santos (1996) and Levine and Zame (1996)
(see also Levine and Zame (2002)), introduces debt constraints
in economies where payments are fully enforced and therefore
there is no default (even on out of equilibrium paths). Magill
and Quinzii (1994) argue in favor of implicit debt constraints
that restrict budget sets to include portfolios whose value is a
bounded sequence along the event tree. An interesting prop-
erty of equilibria with implicit debt constraints is that it is al-
ways possible to find uniform bounds on the value of short-
sales which are non-binding at those equilibria. Moreover, un-
der reasonable assumptions on preferences, equilibria with im-
plicit debt constraints coincide with equilibria with transversal-
ity type conditions that are often imposed in macroeconomic
models (see Blanchard and Fisher (1989) and Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2000)). Herna´ndez and Santos (1996) argue in favor
of debt constraints that impose a kind of solvency requirement.
Households are allowed to borrow against their current value
of future endowment streams. When markets are incomplete,
traders may not agree on current value prices. Herna´ndez and
Santos (1996) propose a special way of computing current value
prices that takes into account the whole set of non-arbitrage
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price systems. Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and
Zame (2002)) offer an alternative formulation of the solvency
requirement. They formalize debt constraints that induce agents
to repay their debt in finite time, that is, the suggested debt con-
strains are finitely effective. Stated differently, finitely effective
constraints induce agents to choose plans that are budget com-
patible with the threat that, at any period, they may be restricted
to have access to borrowing only for a finite number of periods.
Finitely effective debt constraints provide a general characteri-
zation of debt constraints that are compatible with equilibrium.
More precisely, Levine and Zame (1996) have shown that any
loose and consistent debt constraints that rule out Ponzi sche-
mes and ensure existence of an equilibrium reduce to be finitely
effective.3
The second approach, due to Kehoe and Levine (1993) (see
also Kehoe and Levine (2001)), Zhang (1997) and Alvarez and
Jermann (2000), explores debt constraints in economies where
commitment is limited and there is a severe punishment for de-
fault: if agents do not honor their debts, they are excluded from
participating in the asset markets in future periods. In such a
setting the authors argue for self-enforcing constraints that are
tight enough to prevent default at equilibrium but simultane-
ously are loose enough to allow for as much risk sharing as
possible.
The third and most recent approach to deal with Ponzi sche-
mes also considers models with limited commitment. However,
contrary to self-enforcing borrowing constraints (a` la Alvarez
and Jermann (2000)) that prevent default at equilibrium, this re-
search line addresses the issue of Ponzi schemes in economies
where default may be consistent with equilibrium. It is moti-
vated by the empirical observation that modern economies ex-
perience a substantial amount of default and bankruptcy.4 One
of the most important and widespread means of securing loans
and lowering the level of default in financial markets is col-
lateral.5 Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002) (see also
Kubler and Schmedders (2003)) showed that, without imposing
any debt constraints or transversality conditions, Ponzi schemes
3See also Herna´ndez and Santos (1996) for a similar discussion.
4Nowadays, there is a vast literature on default that dates back to the seminal
contributions of Shubik (1972), Shubik and Wilson (1977) and Dubey and Shu-
bik (1979). Default was introduced in a general equilibrium setting by Dubey,
Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1990) and Zame (1993). Modern theoretical con-
tributions on default include among others, Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Zame
(1995), Geanakoplos (1997), Geanakoplos and Zame (2002), Araujo, Pa´scoa,
and Torres-Martı´nez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003), Dubey, Geanako-
plos, and Shubik (2005), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Pa´scoa and Seghir
(2009), Ferreira and Torres-Martı´nez (2010). There are also important con-
tributions on default, collateral and credit constraints in macroeconomics (see
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Ca-
ballero and Krishnamurthy (2001)). This literature emphasizes the feedback
from the fall in collateral prices to a fall in borrowing capacity. Recently, Chat-
terjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rı´os-Rull (2007) and Livshits, MacGee, and
Tertilt (2007) have calibrated macroeconomic models with incomplete markets
and default and used them to address various policy issues.
5Collateral-using activities have expanded rapidly in recent years. Financial
institutions extensively employ collateral in lending, in securities trading and
derivative markets and in payment and settlement systems. Central banks gen-
erally require collateral in their credit operations. Common examples of collat-
eralized lending are home mortgages, margin purchases of securities, overnight
repurchase agreements and pawn shop loans.
are ruled out in economies where collateral is the only mecha-
nism that enforces agents to (partially) pay their debts. The in-
tuition behind their result is as follows: combining short-sales
with the purchase of collateral constitutes a joint operation that
yields non-negative returns.6 By non-arbitrage, at equilibrium,
the price of the collateral exceeds the price of the asset, imply-
ing that collateral costs exceed the value of loans. Therefore, it
becomes impossible to pay a previous debt by issuing new debt.
In most economic systems collateral is not the only mean
of securing loans. The default option usually entails addi-
tional economic consequences.7 This explains the fact that
even in the midst of the most severe housing downturn on
record, many households with negative equity choose to con-
tinue meeting their financial obligations (see, e.g., Gerardi,
Shapiro, and Willen (2007, 2009)) and Gerardi, Lehnert, Sher-
land, and Willen (2011)).
One approach to model additional enforcement mechanisms
is to introduce linear utility penalties (see Dubey, Geanakop-
los, and Shubik (1990), Zame (1993), Dubey, Geanakoplos, and
Shubik (2005) and the literature cited therein). These penalties
might be interpreted as the consequences (directly assessed in
terms of utility) of some third party punishment such as prison
terms and pangs of conscience, and/or of some non-modeled
economic punishment such as exclusion from credit markets
and garnishing of future income.
A surprising result found by Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) is
that the introduction of default penalties in the model of Araujo,
Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002) may induce payments be-
sides the value of the collateral and lead to the reappearance
of Ponzi schemes. The intuition is simple: when penalties are
severe, agents have incentives to repay more than the value of
the depreciated collateral. In this case, the joint operation of
combining short-sales with the purchase of collateral no longer
yields non-negative returns. Therefore, loans may exceed col-
lateral costs and agents may run Ponzi schemes.
One may think that the reappearance of Ponzi schemes is
related to the particular additional enforcement mechanism (lin-
ear utility penalties) Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) have considered.
However, Ferreira and Torres-Martı´nez (2010) showed that, for
sufficiently low collateral requirements, any effective additional
enforcement mechanism implies the non-existence of physi-
cally feasible optimal plans.8 That is, any effective additional
enforcement mechanism gives rise to Ponzi schemes in infinite
horizon collateralized economies. Hence, it is the effectiveness
of the mechanism that induces agents to run a Ponzi scheme,
not the mechanism per se.
6Since there is no other punishment than the seizure of collateral, borrowers
will always deliver the minimum between their promises and the value of the
associated collateral requirements.
7For instance, if an agent files for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the U.S.
bankruptcy code, the following things may happen (see Chatterjee, Corbae,
Nakajima, and Rı´os-Rull (2007)): (1) he is not allowed to save and his existing
savings will be completely garnished; (2) he has to pay a proportion of the
current income as cost of filling for bankruptcy; (3) a proportion of his current
labor income is garnished; (4) his credit history turns bad and he is excluded
from the loan market.
8An enforcement mechanism is said effective if it entails payments besides
the value of the collateral at all nodes of a subtree.
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Given the findings of Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) and Ferreira
and Torres-Martı´nez (2010) we propose to answer the follow-
ing question: what kind of borrowing constraints rule out Ponzi
schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in models with lim-
ited commitment and (possible) default at equilibrium? As a
first step to provide an answer to this question it is natural to
investigate whether debt constraints that have been proposed in
models with full commitment can be compatible with equilib-
rium existence in models with limited commitment. The paper
is an attempt to address this issue. It shows that finitely effective
debt constraints, similar to those proposed by Levine and Zame
(1996) in environments with full commitment, ensure equilib-
rium existence in the models of Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-
Martı´nez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Pa´scoa
and Seghir (2009) where commitment is limited.
A direct adaptation of finitely effective debt constraints a` la
Levine and Zame (1996) in those environments does not help to
control debt along time. The reason is that when commitment
is limited, an agent can always satisfy his budget restrictions
having access to financial markets for a finite number of pe-
riods. He can do this by simply defaulting on his promises.
Therefore, requiring finite-time solvency a` la Levine and Zame
(1996) does not restrict budget sets. In particular, it does not
exclude Ponzi schemes. We address this issue by modifying
appropriately the definition of finitely effective debt constraints
to encompass economies with limited commitment and (possi-
ble) default at equilibrium. Working in this direction, we im-
pose debt constraints by introducing in the setting of Araujo,
Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders
(2003) and Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions
with finite equivalent payoffs.
An interesting finding is that there is a close relation be-
tween our proposed budget sets and the budget sets of Levine
and Zame (1996) as well as the budget sets defined through
collateral obligations and no additional punishments (Araujo,
Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002) and Kubler and Schmed-
ders (2003)). First, our proposed debt constraints provide a nat-
ural formulation of Levine and Zame (1996) solvency require-
ment in those models. When there is full commitment (and
payments are fully enforced) our concept of plans with finitely
equivalent payoffs coincides with the concept of plans with
finitely effective debt introduced by Levine and Zame (1996).
Second and most important, we show that the budget feasible
plans in economies with a collateral structure and zero default
penalties have finite equivalent payoffs and vice versa. In other
words, when there are collateral requirements but no default
penalties, our budget set coincides with the standard one de-
fined in Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002) and Kubler
and Schmedders (2003). This equivalence is valid for any price
process (i.e., not only at equilibrium but also on out of equilib-
rium paths) and illustrates the hidden relation between finitely
effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.
Our approach to debt constraints is certainly not the only
one possible. Instead of adapting the restrictions proposed by
Levine and Zame (1996), one may follow another route by con-
sidering restrictions in the spirit of Magill and Quinzii (1994) or
Herna´ndez and Santos (1996). However, it is not clear whether
those borrowing constraints would be innocuous in models with
collateral requirements and zero default penalties as it is the
case for the constraints we propose. In that respect, we believe
that modifying the approach of Levine and Zame (1996) to con-
trol debt is more suitable for models with limited commitment
and collateral requirements.
Proposing any kind of debt constraints raises an equally im-
portant issue: how difficult is to implement those constraints in
anonymous and competitive markets. In the context of full com-
mitment, Magill and Quinzii (1994) give two possible inter-
pretations of their implicit debt constraints: a subjective (self-
monitoring) interpretation where agents restrict themselves to
satisfy these constraints and an objective (market based) one
where an external agent (an agency) has the ability to restrict
agents to choose plans satisfying the borrowing constraints. In
our context of limited commitment, restricting plans to have
finite equivalent payoffs can be given a similar interpretation.
This is due to the fact that, under mild conditions on primitives,
equilbria with finite equivalent payoffs are equilibria with im-
plicit (or explicit and non-binding) constraints on short-selling.9
In particular, one can show that there exists a threshold bound
related only to primitives (aggregate resources) of the economy
such that any posted bound greater than this threshold will be
non-binding at equilibrium.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we set out
the model, introduce notation, assumptions and the equilibrium
concept in the absence of borrowing constraints. In Section 3
we present and discuss the new debt constraints we impose on
budget feasible plans. We also introduce an equilibrium con-
cept associated with those constraints and highlight its relation
with the equilibrium concepts introduced by Levine and Zame
(1996) and Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002). Sec-
tion 4 proves the existence of what we term equilibrium with fi-
nite equivalent payoffs under a mild condition on default penal-
ties. In Section 5 we discuss equilibrium refinement and high-
light a problem that has been overlooked by the literature. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2. The Model
The model is essentially the one developed in Araujo,
Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002) and extended by Pa´scoa
and Seghir (2009) to allow for the possibility of linear default
penalties.
2.1. Uncertainty and time
Let T ≡ {0, 1, . . . , t, . . .} denote the set of time periods and
let S be a (infinite) set of states of nature. The available in-
formation at period t ∈ T is the same for each agent and is
described by a finite partition Pt of S . Information is revealed
along time, i.e., the partition Pt+1 is finer than Pt for every t.
Every pair (t, σ) where σ is a set in Pt is called a node. The set
9Our bounds (implicit or explicit) are different than those imposed by Magill
and Quinzii (1994). Our bounds restrict short sales while theirs restrict the real
value of debt.
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of all nodes is denoted by D and is called the event tree. We
assume that there is no information at t = 0 and we denote by
ξ0 = (0, S ) the initial node. If ξ = (t, σ) belongs to the event
tree, then t is denoted by t(ξ). We say that ξ′ = (t′, σ′) is a
successor of ξ = (t, σ) if t′ > t and σ′ ⊂ σ; we use the nota-
tion ξ′ > ξ. We denote by ξ+ the set of immediate successors
defined by
ξ+ ≡ {ξ′ ∈ D : t(ξ′) = t(ξ) + 1}.
Because Pt is finer than Pt−1 for every t > 0, for a given
node ξ , ξ0, there is a unique node ξ− in D such that ξ is
an immediate successor of ξ−. Given a period t ∈ T we let
Dt ≡ {ξ ∈ D : t(ξ) = t} denote the set of nodes at period t. The
set of nodes up to period t is denoted Dt ≡ {ξ ∈ D : t(ξ) 6 t}.
2.2. Agents and commodities
There exists a finite set L of commodities available for trade
at every node ξ ∈ D. We interpret x(ξ) ∈ RL+ as a claim to con-
sumption at node ξ. We also write 1{`} ∈ RL+ for the commodity
bundle consisting of one unit of commodity ` ∈ L and nothing
else. We depart from the usual intertemporal models by allow-
ing for some commodities to be non-perishable, that is, we al-
low for storable and durable goods as well as for commodities
that may serve as physical assets (i.e., Lucas trees). Transfor-
mation of commodities is represented by a family (Y(ξ))ξ∈D of
linear functionals Y(ξ) from RL+ to RL+. The bundle Y(ξ)z(ξ−)
represents what is obtained at node ξ if the bundle z(ξ−) ∈ RL+
is purchased at node ξ−. We say that the commodity ` is per-
ishable at node ξ− if Y(ξ)1{`} is the zero vector in RL+, and non-
perishable otherwise. At each node there are spot markets for
trading every commodity. We let p = (p(ξ))ξ∈D be the spot
price process where p(ξ) = (p(ξ, `))`∈L ∈ RL+ is the price vector
at node ξ.
There is a finite set I of infinitely lived agents. Each agent
i ∈ I is characterized by an endowment process ωi = (ωi(ξ))ξ∈D
where ωi(ξ) = (ωi(ξ, `))`∈L is a vector in RL+ representing the
endowment available at node ξ. Each agent chooses a con-
sumption process x = (x(ξ))ξ∈D where x(ξ) ∈ RL+. We denote
by X the set of consumption processes. The utility function
U i : X −→ [0,+∞] is assumed to be additively separable, i.e.,
U i(x) ≡
∑
ξ∈D
ui(ξ, x(ξ))
where ui(ξ, ·) : RL+ −→ [0,∞).
2.3. Assets and collateral
There is a finite set J of short-lived real financial assets
available for trade at each node. For each asset j, the bun-
dle yielded at node ξ is denoted by A(ξ, j) ∈ RL+. We let q =
(q(ξ))ξ∈D be the asset price process where q(ξ) = (q(ξ, j)) j∈J ∈
RJ+ represents the asset price vector at node ξ. We denote by
θi(ξ) ∈ RJ+ the vector of purchases and by ϕi(ξ) ∈ RJ+ the vector
of short-sales at each node ξ.
Following the seminal contribution of Geanakoplos (1997)
and Geanakoplos and Zame (2002) for finite horizon models,
and Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002) together with
Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) for infinite horizon models, assets are
collateralized in the sense that for every unit of asset j sold at
a node ξ, agents should buy a collateral bundle C(ξ, j) ∈ RL+
that protects lenders in case of default. We assume that pay-
ments can be enforced through the seizure of the collateral. At
a node ξ, agent i should deliver the promise V(p, ξ)ϕi(ξ−) where
V(p, ξ) = (V(p, ξ, j)) j∈J and V(p, ξ, j) ≡ p(ξ)A(ξ, j).
However, agent i may decide to default and choose a delivery
di(ξ, j) in units of account. Since the collateral can be seized,
this delivery must satisfy
di(ξ, j) > D(p, ξ, j)ϕi(ξ−, j)
where
D(p, ξ, j) ≡ min{p(ξ)A(ξ, j), p(ξ)Y(ξ)C(ξ−, j)}.
Remark 2.1. Kubler and Schmedders (2003) propose a model
where the collateral requirements are imposed in terms of phys-
ical assets. We show hereafter that a simplified version of their
model can be seen as a particular case of the model proposed
by Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002). In that respect
whenever we are referring to the model proposed by Araujo,
Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002) we are also referring to the
one proposed by Kubler and Schmedders (2003).
If there is a specific commodity g ∈ L satisfying the fol-
lowing properties, then this commodity can be interpreted as a
physical asset or a Lucas tree.
(i) At initial node ξ0, each agent i has an initial endowment
ωi(ξ0, g) > 0 of commodity g which represents his share
of the tree. At subsequent nodes ξ > ξ0, agent i has no
initial endowment in commodity g.
(ii) One unit of commodity g purchased at node ξ delivers at
node µ ∈ ξ+ the bundle
y(µ) ≡ Y(µ)1{g} ∈ RL+.
The g-th coordinate y(µ, g) is equal to 1, i.e., the physical
asset is long lived.
(iii) Each agent i is indifferent with respect to commodity g,
i.e., for each agent i ∈ I, for each node ξ ∈ D, for each
consumption bundle c ∈ RL+, we have
ui(ξ, c + 1{g}) = ui(ξ, c).
(iv) In every successor node µ ∈ ξ+, the transformed bundle of
one unit of commodity g purchased at any node ξ, is a
desirable bundle, i.e., y(µ) is a bundle in RL+ such that for
each consumption bundle c ∈ RL+, we have10
ui(µ, c + y(µ)) > ui(µ, c).
10Since each agent i is indifferent with respect to commodity g, the bundle
delivered by the tree must satisfy y(µ, `) > 0 for at least one commodity ` , g.
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If at every node ξ ∈ D, the collateral bundle C(ξ, j) is only in
terms of commodity g, then the collateral structure of our model
(and the one in Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002) and
Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009)) reduces to the one considered by
Kubler and Schmedders (2003).
Following Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1990) (and
Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005)), we assume that
agent i feels a disutility λi(ξ, j) ∈ [0,+∞] from defaulting.11
More precisely, if an agent defaults at node ξ, then he suffers at
t = 0, the disutility
∑
j∈J
λi(ξ, j)
[
V(p, ξ, j)ϕi(ξ−, j) − di(ξ, j)
]+
p(ξ)v(ξ)
where (v(ξ))ξ∈D is an exogenously specified process in RL++ that
is uniformly bounded away from 0.12 In that case, agent i may
have an incentive to deliver more than the minimum between
his debt and the depreciated value of his collateral, i.e., we may
have di(ξ, j) > D(p, ξ, j)ϕi(ξ−, j).
As in Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005) assets are
thought as pools. At each node ξ the sales ϕi(ξ, j) are pooled at
the market for asset j. The deliveries di(ξ, j) on asset j are also
pooled and the buyers of pool j receive a pro rata share of all its
different sellers’ deliveries. We assume that lenders rationally
anticipate that every borrower delivers at least D(p, ξ, j) on each
unit of asset j sold at node ξ−. Therefore, agents anticipate
that each share of pool j delivers a fraction V(κ, p, ξ, j) of its
promise V(p, ξ, j) defined by
V(κ, p, ξ, j) = κ(ξ, j)V(p, ξ, j) + (1 − κ(ξ, j))D(p, ξ, j)
where κ(ξ, j) ∈ [0, 1] will be determined at equilibrium such
that deliveries match payments.13 The buyer of asset j does not
need to know the identities of the sellers or the quantities of
their sales. All that matters to him is the price q(ξ, j) and the
anticipated delivery rates (κ(µ, j))µ∈ξ+ .
2.4. Budget set without debt constraints
We let A be the space of adapted processes a = (a(ξ))ξ∈D
with14
a(ξ) = (x(ξ), θ(ξ), ϕ(ξ), d(ξ)) ∈ RL+ × RJ+ × RJ+ × RJ+.
Given a process (p, q, κ) of commodity prices, asset prices and
delivery rates, agent i’s choice ai = (xi, θi, ϕi, di) ∈ A must
satisfy, in each decision node ξ ∈ D, the following constraints:
11Models with non-pecuniary penalties for default also include Diamond
(1984), Rea (1984), who considers contracts involving “arm-breaking”, Zame
(1993), Araujo, Monteiro, and Pa´scoa (1998), Bisin and Gottardi (1999), San-
tos and Scheinkman (2001), Lacker (2001) and Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009).
12More precisely, we assume that there exists v > 0 such that for every node
ξ ∈ D and every commodity ` ∈ L, we have v(ξ, `) > v.
13If all the sellers of asset j at node ξ− fully deliver on their promises at
the successor node ξ then κ(ξ, j) = 1, while if all sellers fully default on their
promises then κ(ξ, j) = 0.
14By convention we pose a(ξ−0 ) = (x(ξ
−
0 ), θ(ξ
−
0 ), ϕ(ξ
−
0 ), d(ξ
−
0 )) = (0, 0, 0, 0).
(a) solvency constraint:
p(ξ)xi(ξ)+
∑
j∈J
di(ξ, j)+q(ξ)θi(ξ) 6 p(ξ)ωi(ξ)
+p(ξ)Y(ξ)xi(ξ−) + V(κ, p, ξ)θi(ξ−) + q(ξ)ϕi(ξ); (2.1)
(b) collateral requirement:
C(ξ)ϕi(ξ) 6 xi(ξ); (2.2)
(c) minimum delivery:
∀ j ∈ J, D(p, ξ, j)ϕi(ξ−, j) 6 di(ξ, j). (2.3)
The set of plans a = (x, θ, ϕ, d) ∈ A satisfying constraints (2.1),
(2.2) and (2.3) is called the (unconstrained) budget set and is
denoted by Bi(p, q, κ).
2.5. The payoff function
Consider that agent i has chosen the plan a = (x, θ, ϕ, d)
under a process of prices and delivery rates pi = (p, q, κ). He
enjoys the utility
U i(x) =
∑
ξ∈D
ui(ξ, x(ξ)) ∈ [0,∞]
but he suffers the disutility W i(p, a) ∈ [0,∞] defined by
W i(p, a) ≡
∑
ξ>ξ0
∑
j∈J
λi(ξ, j)
[
V(p, ξ, j)ϕ(ξ−, j) − d(ξ, j)]+
p(ξ)v(ξ)
.
We would like to define the payoff Πi(p, a) of the plan a as the
following difference
Πi(p, a) = U i(x) −W i(p, a).
Unfortunately, Πi(p, a) may not be well defined if both U i(x)
and W i(p, a) are infinite. We propose to consider the binary
relation i,p defined on A by a˜ i,p a when
∃ε > 0, ∃T ∈ N, ∀t > T, Πi,t(p, a˜) > Πi,t(p, a) + ε
where
Πi,t(p, a) ≡ U i,t(x) −W i,t(p, a), U i,t(x) ≡
∑
ξ∈Dt
ui(ξ, x(ξ))
and
W i,t(p, a) ≡
∑
ξ∈Dt\{ξ0}
∑
j∈J
λi(ξ, j)
[
V(p, ξ, j)ϕ(ξ−, j) − d(ξ, j)]+
p(ξ)v(ξ)
.
According to this definition, a plan a˜ is strictly preferred to a
if the difference of payoffs Πi,t(p, a˜) − Πi,t(p, a) between the
two plans is uniformly strictly positive for every period t large
enough.15
Observe that if Πi(p, a˜) and Πi(p, a) are finite then a˜ i,p a
if and only Πi(p, a˜) > Πi(p, a). We denote by Prefi(p, a) the set
of plans strictly preferred to plan a by agent i.
15The sequence of differences (Πi,t(p, a˜)−Πi,t(p, a))t>1 need not be converg-
ing.
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2.6. Assumptions
For each agent i, we denote by Ωi the process of accumu-
lated endowments, defined recursively by Ωi(ξ) = Y(ξ)Ωi(ξ−) +
ωi(ξ) where Ωi(ξ0) = ωi(ξ0). The process
∑
i∈I Ωi of accumu-
lated aggregate endowments is denoted by Ω. The following
assumptions on the characteristics of the economy are standard
in the literature of infinite horizon models with collateral re-
quirements.
Assumption 2.1 (Agents). For every agent i,
(H.1) the process of accumulated endowments is strictly posi-
tive and uniformly bounded from above, i.e.,
∃Ωi ∈ RL++, ∀ξ ∈ D, Ωi(ξ) ∈ RL++ and Ωi(ξ) 6 Ω
i
;
(H.2) for every node ξ, the utility function ui(ξ, ·) is concave,
continuous and strictly increasing,16 with ui(ξ, 0) = 0;
(H.3) the infinite sum U i(Ω) is finite.
Assumption 2.2 (Financial assets). For every asset j and
node ξ, the collateral C(ξ, j) is not zero.
It should be clear that these assumptions always hold
throughout the paper.
2.7. Equilibrium without debt constraints
We denote by Ξ the set of prices and delivery rates (p, q, κ)
normalized as follows: for every node ξ, we have p(ξ) ∈ R++,
κ(ξ) ∈ [0, 1]J and (p(ξ), q(ξ)) belongs to the simplex ∆(L× J).17
Given a process (p, q, κ) of commodity prices, asset prices and
delivery rates, we denote by di(p, q, κ) the demand set defined
by
di(p, q, κ) ≡ {a ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) : Prefi(p, a) ∩ Bi(p, q, κ) = ∅}.
Definition 2.1. A competitive equilibrium for the economy E
is a family of prices and delivery rates (p, q, κ) ∈ Ξ and an
allocation a = (ai)i∈I with ai ∈ A such that
(a) for every agent i, the plan ai is optimal, i.e.,
ai ∈ di(p, q, κ);
(b) commodity markets clear at every node, i.e.,∑
i∈I
xi(ξ0) =
∑
i∈I
ωi(ξ0) (2.4)
and for all ξ , ξ0,∑
i∈I
xi(ξ) =
∑
i∈I
[
ωi(ξ) + Y(ξ)xi(ξ−)
]
; (2.5)
16Assuming that the function ui(ξ, ·) is strictly increasing is not compatible
with the interpretation of a commodity as a Lucas tree. This assumption was
made only for expositional purposes and can be weakened as follows: for every
ξ the function ui(ξ, ·) is non-decreasing and there exists a commodity ` that is
strictly desirable in the sense that for every pair x, y inRL+, we have ui(ξ, x+y) >
ui(ξ, x) provided that y(`) > 0.
17In the sense that p(ξ) ∈ RL+, q(ξ) ∈ RJ+ and
∑
`∈L p(ξ, `) +
∑
j∈J q(ξ, j) = 1.
(c) asset markets clear at every node, i.e., for all ξ ∈ D,∑
i∈I
θi(ξ) =
∑
i∈I
ϕi(ξ); (2.6)
(d) deliveries match at every node, i.e., for all ξ , ξ0 and all
j ∈ J,∑
i∈I
V(κ, p, ξ, j)θi(ξ−, j) =
∑
i∈I
di(ξ, j). (2.7)
The set of allocations a = (ai)i∈I in A satisfying the market
clearing conditions (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6) is denoted by F. Each
allocation in F is called physically feasible. A plan ai ∈ A is
called physically feasible if there exists a physically feasible al-
location b such that ai = bi. The set of physically feasible plans
is denoted by Fi. We denote by Eq(E) the set of competitive
equilibria for the economy E.
3. Debt constraints
In this section, we show how to adapt the finitely effective
debt constraints proposed by Levine and Zame (1996) to infinite
horizon models with limited commitment and default penalties.
While keeping the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we
expect in our model, we prove that the proposed constraints are
compatible with equilibrium (precluding agents to run Ponzi
schemes). Moreover, our constraints appear to have an addi-
tional appealing feature: we show that the budget sets associ-
ated with those constraints coincide with the standard budget
sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties
(as defined in Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002) and
Kubler and Schmedders (2003)).
3.1. Infinite default penalties
When default penalties are infinite and the collateral re-
quirements are zero, our model reduces to the one studied by
Magill and Quinzii (1994) and Levine and Zame (1996). In
the absence of debt constraints, an equilibrium may not ex-
ist: all traders would attempt to finance unbounded levels of
consumption by unbounded levels of borrowing. To rule out
Ponzi schemes, Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and
Zame (2002)) formalize the concept of plans with finitely effec-
tive debt by requiring agents’ actions to be budget compatible
with the threat that, at any period, agents may be restricted to
have access to borrowing for only a finite number of periods. In
other words, an agent’s debt is finitely effective if at any period,
the debt is repayable within a finite horizon. More formally,
we consider the following definition due to Levine and Zame
(1996).
Definition 3.1. A plan a ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) is said to have finitely
effective debt, if for each period t > 0, there exists a period
T > t and a plan â also in the budget set Bi(p, q, κ) such that
(i) up to period t both plans coincide, i.e.,
∀ξ ∈ Dt, â(ξ) = a(ξ);
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(ii) at every node after period T , there is solvency without bor-
rowing, i.e.,
∀ξ ∈ D, t(ξ) > T =⇒ ϕ̂(ξ) = 0.
The intuition behind Definition 3.1 can be better understood
if we think about the role of those restrictions in the finite hori-
zon framework. No short selling at the terminal date implicitly
imposes a solvency requirement at earlier dates. That is, at any
node agents should hold an amount of debt that they will be
able to repay by the end of the terminal date. In the absence of
a terminal date, it is necessary to impose explicitly or implicitly
that solvency requirement.
Remark 3.1. Consider the following notation. For each period
t, we denote by At the set of plans a ∈ A where a(ξ) = (0, 0, 0, 0)
for each ξ such that t(ξ) > t. If a is a plan in A and t is a period,
we denote by a1[0,t] the plan in At which coincides with a for
every node ξ ∈ Dt.18 Following this notation, a plan a has a
finitely effective debt if for each period t > 0, there exists a
subsequent period T > t and a plan â such that
â ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) ∩CT and a1[0,t] = â1[0,t]
where CT is the set of plans a in A without borrowing after
period T in the sense that
∀ξ ∈ D, t(ξ) > T =⇒ ϕ̂(ξ) = 0.
Instead of restricting plans to be finitely effective, one may
consider the following alternative restriction.
Definition 3.2. A budget feasible plan a ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) is said to
have finite equivalent utility when for every period t > 0 and
every ε > 0 there exists a subsequent period T > t and a plan â
such that
(i) the plans a and â coincide up to period t, i.e., a1[0,t] = â1[0,t];
(ii) the plan â is budget feasible and there is no borrowing after
period T , i.e., â ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) ∩CT ;
(iii) the utility of the plan â may be lower than the payoff of a
but not more than ε, i.e.,
inf
τ>T
[
U i,τ(p, â) − U i,τ(p, a)
]
> −ε.
In other words, a budget feasible plan a has finite equivalent
utility if in case where at some period t the agent is restricted to
have access to borrowing for finitely many periods, then he can
find an alternative plan â doing the job, i.e., satisfying (i) and
(ii); but at the same time the utility loss can be made as small
as desired.
The following proposition shows the equivalence between
plans with finitely effective debt and plans having finite equiv-
alent utility. This alternative characterization will be proven
particularly useful in the process of modifying finitely effective
constraints to encompass models with limited commitment.
18The plan a1[0,t] can be interpreted as a “truncation” of a up to period t.
Proposition 3.1. Assume that the default penalty is infinite and
consider a budget feasible plan a ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) with a finite util-
ity U i(x) < ∞. The plan a has finitely effective debt, if and only
if, it has finite equivalent utility.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Let a ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) be a budget feasi-
ble plan with a finite utility U i(x) < ∞. It is obvious that if a
has finite equivalent utility, then it has a finitely effective debt.
The converse deserves more attention. Assume that the plan a
has a finitely effective debt. Fix a period t > 0 and ε > 0. If
we apply the definition to the period t, we get the existence of a
period T > t and a plan â such that
â ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) ∩CT and a1[0,t] = â1[0,t].
Unfortunately, we do not know if U i,T (x̂) > U i,T (x) − ε. How-
ever, we know that the utility U i(x) is finite. Therefore, there
exists t′ > t such that∑
s>t′
∑
ξ∈Ds
ui(ξ, x(ξ)) 6 ε. (3.1)
Now, applying the definition of finitely effective debt for the
period t′, there exists a period T > t′ and a plan â such that
â ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) ∩CT and a1[0,t′] = â1[0,t′].
Now fix τ > T . Since T > t′, we have
U i,τ(x̂) > U i,t′ (x̂) = U i,t′ (x)
> U i,τ(x) −
∑
t′<s6τ
∑
ξ∈Ds
ui(ξ, x(ξ)).
It follows from (3.1) that U i,τ(x̂) > U i,τ(x) − ε.
3.2. Finite default penalties
The concept of finitely effective debt constraints makes per-
fect sense in models with full enforcement and perfect com-
mitment (i.e., no default). However, with limited commitment,
imposing finitely effective debt constraints does not help to con-
trol debt along time. We provide an explanation below. Let
a = (x, θ, ϕ, d) be a plan in Bi(p, q, κ) and t be any period. Con-
sider the plan â defined by
â(ξ) =

a(ξ) if t(ξ) 6 t
(ωi(ξ), 0, 0,D(p, ξ)ϕ(ξ−)) if t(ξ) = t + 1
(ωi(ξ), 0, 0, 0) if t(ξ) > t + 1.
This plan belongs to the set Bi(p, q, κ)∩Ct+1 and coincides with
a on every node up to period t. That is, under limited com-
mitment, any plan a ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) has finitely effective debt ac-
cording to Definition 3.1. Agents can always default up to the
minimum value between their debt and the depreciated value of
their collateral. Therefore, there is no hope to bound debt along
time.
We introduce hereafter an endogenous restriction on trades
that allows to encompass models with limited commitment and
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finite default penalties. The point of our departure is Propo-
sition 3.1 where it is shown that, when default penalties are
infinite, restricting plans to have finitely effective debt is equiv-
alent to restricting plans to have finite equivalent utility. This
equivalence breaks down in the presence of finite default penal-
ties. In this case, we proceed by replacing “utility” by “payoff”
and we introduce the concept of plans with finite equivalent
payoffs. We claim that requiring plans to have finite equivalent
payoffs provides an appropriate adaptation of finitely effective
debt constraints to models with limited commitment and finite
default penalties. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 3.3. A plan a in the budget set Bi(p, q, κ) has finite
equivalent payoffs if for every period t > 0 and every ε > 0
there exists a subsequent period T > t and a plan â such that
(i) the plans a and â coincide up to period t, i.e., a1[0,t] = â1[0,t];
(ii) the plan â is budget feasible and there is no borrowing after
period T , i.e. â ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) ∩CT ;
(iii’) the payoff of the plan â may be lower than the payoff of
the initial plan a but not more than ε, i.e.,
inf
τ>T
[
Πi,τ(p, â) − Πi,τ(p, a)
]
> −ε.
The interpretation of a plan with finite equivalent payoff is
similar to the one of a plan with finite equivalent utility. The
only difference is that we replace “utility” by “payoff”. This
is very intuitive since agents may suffer a loss in utility when
defaulting.
3.3. Equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs
We denote by Bi?(p, q, κ) the set of all plans in B
i(p, q, κ)
having finite equivalent payoffs and we let di?(p, q, κ) be the
associated demand set.19
Definition 3.4. A competitive equilibrium with finite equiva-
lent payoffs for the economy E is a family of prices and deliv-
ery rates (p, q, κ) ∈ Ξ together with an allocation a = (ai)i∈I
with ai ∈ A such that the conditions of market clearing (b),
(c) and (d) in Definition 2.1 are satisfied and the unconstrained
optimality condition (a) is replaced by
(a’) for every agent i, the plan ai has finite equivalent payoffs
and is optimal among all budget feasible plans with finite
equivalent payoffs, i.e., ai ∈ di?(p, q, κ).
We denote by Eq?(E) the set of competitive equilibria with
finite equivalent payoffs for the economy E. We prove in Sec-
tion 4.3 that the set Eq?(E) is non-empty under a mild condi-
tion on default penalties. Before addressing the existence issue,
we explore hereafter the relation between the equilibrium con-
cept that we have just introduced with the one found in Araujo,
Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002).
19That is, di?(p, q, κ) ≡ {a ∈ Bi?(p, q, κ) : Prefi(p, a) ∩ Bi?(p, q, κ) = ∅}.
3.4. No default penalty
We consider the case where collateral repossession is
the only enforcement mechanism and that default penalties
are equal to zero as in Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez
(2002) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003). One may expect
Bi?(p, q, κ) to be a strict subset of B
i(p, q, κ). However, as the
following proposition shows, the two sets coincide. In fact, in
the model proposed by Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez
(2002), any budget feasible allocation with a finite utility has
finite equivalent payoffs. This is a consequence of the absence
of default penalties or explicit economic punishments.
Proposition 3.2. Assume that there is no default penalty and
let a = (x, θ, ϕ, d) be a plan in the budget set Bi(p, q, κ). If U i(x)
is finite then a has finite equivalent payoffs, i.e., a belongs to
Bi?(p, q, κ).
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Fix an agent i and consider a budget
feasible plan a ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) with a finite utility. Fix a period
t > 0 and ε > 0. Since U i(x) is finite, there exists T > t + 1
such that∑
τ>T
∑
ξ∈Dτ
ui(ξ, x(ξ)) 6 ε.
Consider now the plan â defined by
â(ξ) =

a(ξ) if t(ξ) < T
(ωi(ξ), 0, 0, d̂(ξ)) if t(ξ) = T
(ωi(ξ), 0, 0, 0) if t(ξ) > T
where
∀ξ ∈ DT , ∀ j ∈ J, d̂(ξ, j) = D(p, ξ, j)ϕ(ξ−, j).
Observe that the plan â is budget feasible, belongs to CT and
satisfies
â1[0,T−1] = a1[0,T−1].
Fix τ > T . Since T − 1 > t, in order to prove that the plan
a has finite equivalent payoffs, we need to compare U i,τ(x̂) and
U i,τ(x). Observe that
U i,τ(x̂) = U i,T−1(x) +
∑
T6s6τ
∑
ξ∈Ds
ui(ξ, ωi(ξ))
> U i,T−1(x)
> U i,τ(x) −
∑
T6s6τ
∑
ξ∈Ds
ui(ξ, x(ξ))
> U i,τ(x) − ε.
We have thus proved that the plan a has finite equivalent
payoffs.
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A direct implication of the last proposition is that, when
there is no loss of utility in case of default, the sets Eq(E) and
Eq?(E) coincide. This observation allows us to obtain the ex-
istence result of Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002) as
a direct corollary of our equilibrium existence result (see Sec-
tion 4).
Proposition 3.3. If there is no default penalty then (pi, a) is a
competitive equilibrium, if and only if, it is a competitive equi-
librium with finite equivalent payoffs, i.e., the sets Eq(E) and
Eq?(E) coincide.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Let (pi, a) ∈ Eq(E) be a competitive
equilibrium. Fix an agent i ∈ I. In order to prove that ai belongs
to the demand di?(pi), it is sufficient to prove that a
i has finite
equivalent payoffs. Since a is feasible we have xi(ξ) 6 Ω(ξ).
From (H.3), we get that U i(xi) is finite. The desired result fol-
lows from Proposition 3.2.
Now let (pi, a) ∈ Eq?(E) be a competitive equilibrium with
finite equivalent payoffs. We only have to prove that ai belongs
to di(pi) for each agent i. Fix an agent i and assume by contradic-
tion that there exists a plan a in Bi(pi) such that U i(x) > U i(xi).
If U i(x) is finite then, applying Proposition 3.2, we get that
a ∈ Bi?(pi): contradiction. Therefore, we must have U i(x) = ∞,
implying that there exists T > 1 such that
U i,T (x) > U i(xi).
Consider the plan â defined by
â(ξ) =

a(ξ) if t(ξ) 6 T
(ωi(ξ), 0, 0, d̂(ξ)) if t(ξ) = T + 1
(ωi(ξ), 0, 0, 0) if t(ξ) > T + 1
where
∀ξ ∈ DT+1, ∀ j ∈ J, d̂(ξ, j) = D(p, ξ, j)ϕ(ξ−, j).
Since the plan â ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) and U i(x̂) < ∞, Proposition 3.2
implies that it has finite equivalent payoffs, i.e., â ∈ Bi?(p, q, κ).
Moreover we have
U i(x̂) = U i,T (x) +
∑
ξ∈D\DT
ui(ξ, ωi(ξ)) > U i(xi).
This contradicts the optimality of ai in Bi?(p, q, κ).
4. Precluding Ponzi schemes
Levine and Zame (1996) proved that finitely effective debt
constraints are compatible with equilibrium when the default
penalty is infinite and no collateral is required. We argued in the
previous section that a reasonable adaptation of those endoge-
nous borrowing constraints to models with limited commitment
is to restrict plans to have finite equivalent payoffs. We for-
mally defined the concept of equilibrium with finite equivalent
payoffs and we have shown its relation with respect to the equi-
librium concepts found in the papers of Araujo, Pa´scoa, and
Torres-Martı´nez (2002) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003). In
this section, we are concerned with the issue of existence of
such equilibria. We show that if agents are myopic with respect
to default penalties, restricting actions to have finite equivalent
payoffs allows to rule out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the ex-
istence of an equilibrium. Myopia in our setting refers to the
time preference of default: the disutility of defaulting today is
greater than the disutility of defaulting in the distant future and
vanishes in the long run. In other words, myopia implies a rea-
sonable restriction on the asymptotic behavior of default penal-
ties. We exhibit below a large class of “standard” economies
for which agents are myopic with respect to default penalties.
4.1. Myopia with respect to default penalties
Before introducing the formal definition of myopic agents
with respect to default penalties, we need to introduce some
notations. For each asset j and node ξ, we denote by M(ξ, j)
the real number
min
`∈L
Ω(ξ, `)
C(ξ, j, `)
which corresponds to the maximum amount of short-sales in
asset j at node ξ that is consistent with the equilibrium condi-
tion of market clearing. Observe that under Assumption 2.2, we
have M(ξ, j) < ∞. Finally, for every node ξ , ξ0 we let20
H(ξ, j) = sup
p∈∆(L)
[
pA(ξ, j) − pY(ξ)C(ξ−, j)]+
pv(ξ)
.
The quantity H(ξ, j) is the maximum amount in real terms that
an agent may default on every unit of asset j he sold short at the
preceding node ξ−. Indeed, it is straightforward to verify that if
a = (x, θ, ϕ, d) in A is a physically feasible plan and (p, q, κ) in
Π is a process of prices and delivery rates, then for each node ξ
and each asset j, we have ϕ(ξ, j) 6 M(ξ, j) and[
V(p, ξ, j)ϕ(ξ−, j) − d(ξ, j)]+
pv(ξ)
6 M(ξ−, j)H(ξ, j).
Definition 4.1. Agent i is said to be myopic with respect to
default penalties if the disutility suffered at the initial period
from defaulting in the long run is negligible, i.e.,
lim inf
T→∞
∑
ξ∈DT
∑
j∈J
λi(ξ, j)H(ξ, j)M(ξ−, j) = 0.
Agent i is said to be uniformly myopic with respect to default
penalties when
lim inf
T→∞
∑
ξ∈DT
∑
j∈J
λi(ξ, j)H(ξ, j) = 0.
Assuming that agents are myopic with respect to default
penalties is a very mild assumption since it is automatically sat-
isfied for every standard economy as defined below (see e.g.
Araujo and Sandroni (1999)).
20The set ∆(L) is the simplex in RL+, i.e., ∆(L) = {p ∈ RL+ :
∑
`∈L p(`) = 1}.
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Definition 4.2. The economy E is said standard if Assump-
tions 2.1 and 2.2 are satisfied and if for each agent i there exist
(S.1) a discount factor βi ∈ (0, 1);
(S.2) a sequence (Pit)t>1 of beliefs about nodes at period t rep-
resented by a probability Pit ∈ Prob(Dt);
(S.3) a Bernoulli function vi : D × RL+ → [0,∞) where vi(ξ, ·)
is the cardinal felicity function at node ξ;
(S.4) a current default penalty µi(ξ, j) ∈ (0,∞) for each node
ξ > ξ0;
such that for each node ξ ∈ D,
ui(ξ, ·) = [βi]t(ξ)Pit(ξ)(ξ)vi(ξ, ·)
for each j ∈ J,
λi(ξ, j) = [βi]t(ξ)Pit(ξ)(ξ)µ
i(ξ, j)
and the processes (A(ξ, j))ξ>ξ0 , (µ
i(ξ, j))ξ>ξ0 and (G(ξ, j))ξ∈D are
uniformly bounded from above, where
G(ξ, j) =
1
max`∈L C(ξ, j, `)
.
Remark 4.1. In a standard economy, one may have that current
default penalties are time and state independent, i.e., µi(ξ, j) =
µ( j). In that case, assuming that agents are myopic with respect
to default penalties does not impose any restriction on µ( j): it
can be as large as desired.
Remark 4.2. If every process M( j) ≡ (M(ξ, j))ξ∈D is uniformly
bounded away from 0 then myopia implies uniform myopia. In
particular, this is the case if we strengthen Assumptions 2.1 and
2.2 by assuming the following properties:
(A.1) The process Ω is uniformly bounded away from 0, i.e.,
there exists Ω ∈ RL++ such that Ω(ξ) > Ω for every ξ.
(A.2) For every asset j, the process C( j) ≡ (C(ξ, j))ξ∈D is uni-
formly bounded from above, i.e., there exists C( j) ∈ RL+
such that C(ξ, j) 6 C( j) for every ξ.
On the other hand, if every process M( j) is uniformly boun-
ded from above then uniform myopia implies myopia. This is
in particular the case if we impose the following additional as-
sumption.
(A.3) For every asset j, the process C( j) of collateral require-
ments does not eventually vanishes in the sense that there
exists C( j) > 0 such that
∀ξ ∈ D, max
`∈L
C(ξ, j, `) > C( j).
Finally, if the process M( j) is uniformly bounded from above
and away from 0, then the concepts of uniform myopia and
myopia coincide. Uniform myopia is useful when we discuss
issues regarding the implementation of our equilibrium concept
(See Section 4.2).
When agents are myopic with respect to default penalties,
any budget and physically feasible plan a ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) ∩ Fi has
actually finite equivalent payoffs. This result will turn out to be
crucial in the process of proving the existence of an equilibrium
with finite equivalent payoffs.
Proposition 4.1. If agent i is myopic with respect to default
penalties, then every budget and physically feasible plan has
finite equivalent payoffs. In other words, we have
Bi(p, q, κ)
⋂
Fi ⊂ Bi?(p, q, κ).
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Fix an agent i and consider a plan a
that is budget and physically feasible, i.e., a ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) ∩ Fi.
Fix a period t > 0 and ε > 0. Since the allocation a is physically
feasible, we have x(ξ) 6 Ω(ξ), implying that∑
ξ∈D
ui(ξ, x(ξ)) < ∞.
Therefore there exists T 0 > 1 such that∑
T>T 0
∑
ξ∈DT
ui(ξ, x(ξ)) 6 ε
2
.
Since agent i is myopic with respect to default penalties, there
exists T > max{t,T 0} such that∑
ξ∈DT
∑
j∈J
λi(ξ, j)H(ξ, j) 6 ε
2
.
Consider now the plan â defined by
â(ξ) =

a(ξ) if t(ξ) < T
(ωi(ξ), 0, 0, d̂(ξ)) if t(ξ) = T
(ωi(ξ), 0, 0, 0) if t(ξ) > T
where
∀ξ ∈ DT , ∀ j ∈ J, d̂(ξ, j) = D(p, ξ, j)ϕ(ξ−, j).
Observe that the plan â satisfies
â ∈ Bi(p, q, κ) ∩CT and â1[0,T−1] = a1[0,T−1].
Moreover, for every τ > T we have
Πi,T (p, â) > Πi,T−1(p, â) +
∑
ξ∈DT
ui(ξ, ωi(ξ))
−
∑
ξ∈DT
∑
j∈J
λi(ξ, j)H(ξ, j)M(ξ−, j)
> Πi,T−1(p, a) −
∑
ξ∈DT
∑
j∈J
λi(ξ, j)H(ξ, j)M(ξ−, j)
> Πi,T−1(p, a) − ε
2
> Πi,τ(p, a) − ε
2
−
∑
T6s6τ
∑
ξ∈Ds
ui(ξ, x(ξ))
> Πi,τ(p, a) − ε.
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It follows that for every τ > T
Πi,τ(p, â) = Πi,T (p, â) +
∑
ξ∈Dτ\DT
ui(ξ, ωi(ξ)) > Πi,τ(p, a) − ε.
Since T −1 > t, this implies that the plan a has finite equivalent
payoffs.
Remark 4.3. Given Proposition 4.1 one may wonder whether
restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs is relevant to
the issue of existence. Since myopia implies that budget and
physically feasible plans have finite equivalent payoffs, why
one should impose any kind of debt constraints on available
plans to ensure existence? The answer to this question lies on
the fact that in decentralized economies agents do not take into
account feasibility restrictions when they solve their maximiza-
tion problem. Only budgetary restrictions are relevant for them.
But if this is the case, in the absence of borrowing constraints,
agents can run a Ponzi scheme and equilibria may fail to exist.21
4.2. Implementation of equilibria with finite equivalent payoffs
The introduction of debt constraints raises issues related to
the implementation of those constraints in decentralized anony-
mous markets. When there is no default penalty implementa-
tion is not an issue. Indeed, Proposition 3.3 states that in this
case our constraints on plans is innocuous.22 The case where
default penalties are non-zero requires more elaboration.
When there is full commitment, Magill and Quinzii (1994)
rule out Ponzi schemes by imposing implicit or explicit and
non-binding bounds on the real value of debt. They subse-
quently argue for either a subjective (self-monitoring) interpre-
tation of implicit bounds or an objective (market-based) inter-
pretation when bounds are explicit. We propose to show that in
our context of limited commitment the same kind of interpreta-
tion applies. More precisely, we show that equilibria with finite
equivalent payoffs are equilibria with implicit (or explicit and
non-binding) bounds on short sales.
To prove our claim, we introduce first some notations.
Given a number m > 0, we let Bim(p, q, κ) be the subset of all
plans a = (x, θ, ϕ, d) in the unconstrained budget set Bi(p, q, κ)
such that the process ϕ is uniformly bounded by m. The set
∪m>0Bim(p, q, κ) is denoted by Bi∞(p, q, κ) and corresponds to all
plans a = (x, θ, ϕ, d) in the unconstrained budget set Bi(p, q, κ)
such that the process ϕ is uniformly bounded, i.e., ϕ ∈ `∞(D).
The set Bi∞(p, q, κ) is called the budget set with implicit bounds
on short-selling and Bim(p, q, κ) is called the budget set with ex-
plicit bound m on short-selling.
Definition 4.3. A competitive equilibrium with explicit bounds
(implicit bounds) on short-selling is a family of prices and de-
livery rates (p, q, κ) and a allocation a = (ai)i∈I where each
ai is optimal in the constrained budget set Bim(p, q, κ) (resp.
Bi∞(p, q, κ)) and all markets clear. We denote by Eqm(E)
21Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) provide an example of an economy with myopic
agents and no borrowing constraints in which equilibria fail to exist.
22In particular, we recover the existence result in Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-
Martı´nez (2002). See Corollary 4.2.
(Eq∞(E)) the set of all competitive equilibria with explicit
bounds m (resp. implicit bounds) on short-selling.
The following proposition shows that, under uniform my-
opia with respect to default penalties, plans with implicit con-
straints on short-sales have finite equivalent payoffs.23
Proposition 4.2. If agent i is uniformly myopic with respect to
default penalties then every plan with implicit bounds on short-
selling has finite equivalent payoffs, i.e., for every price process
(p, q, κ) we have Bi∞(p, q, κ) ⊂ Bi?(p, q, κ).
We can now provide a formal proof of our claim: equilibria
with finite equivalent payoffs are indeed equilibria with implicit
(or explicit and non-binding) bounds on short sales.
Corollary 4.1. Consider an economy where every agent is uni-
formly myopic with respect to default penalties. Assume that for
every asset j, there exists a lower bound C( j) > 0 on collateral
requirements, i.e.,
∀ξ ∈ D, max
`∈L
C(ξ, j, `) > C( j). (4.1)
Then every competitive equilibrium with finite equivalent pay-
offs is
(1) an equilibrium with implicit bounds on short-selling;
(2) an equilibrium with explicit bounds m > m on short-selling
where
m ≡ max
j∈J
∑
i∈I Ω
i
C( j)
.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. Let ((p, q, κ), a) be a competitive equi-
librium with finite equivalent payoffs, i.e., ((p, q, κ), a) ∈
Eq?(E). Given Proposition 4.2, to prove the corollary we only
have to show that for every agent i, the plan ai belongs to
Bim(p, q, κ) for every m > m. Since the allocation a is physi-
cally feasible, we get that the process ϕ of short-sales satisfies
∀ξ ∈ D, ∀ j ∈ J, ϕi(ξ, j) 6 M(ξ, j).
The desired result follows from Assumption 2.1 and condi-
tion (4.1).
Remark 4.4. It follows from the above arguments that if the
bound m is such that m > m then this bound is never binding at
equilibrium.
4.3. Existence
The main contribution of this paper is the following exis-
tence result.
Theorem 4.1. If every agent is myopic with respect to default
penalties then a competitive equilibrium with finite equivalent
payoffs exists, i.e., Eq?(E) , ∅.
23The proof follows almost verbatim the arguments of the proof of Proposi-
tion 4.1 and therefore is omitted.
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We propose a simple proof based on the standard “trunca-
tion argument”.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. For each τ ∈ T , we denote by Eτ the
truncation of the economy for which the final period is τ. Fol-
lowing the arguments in Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009),24 it is possi-
ble to prove that under our set of assumptions, there exist a pro-
cess of prices and delivery rates piτ = (pτ, qτ, κτ) and a process
of plans aτ = (ai,τ)i∈I such that (piτ, aτ) is a competitive equilib-
rium for the truncated economy Eτ with ‖pτ(ξ)‖ > m(ξ) > 0 for
some m(ξ) that depends only on the primitives of the economy
E (and is independent of the truncation size τ).25
We denote by cl Ξ the closure of Ξ under the weak topol-
ogy.26 Each process piτ belongs to cl Ξ which is weakly compact
as a product of compact sets. Passing to a subsequence if nec-
essary, we can assume that the sequence (piτ)τ∈T converges to a
process pi = (p, q, κ) in cl Ξ. Observe that, for each node ξ ∈ D,
we have ‖p(ξ)‖ > m(ξ) > 0. In particular, for each period t and
every plan a ∈ A, the payoff Πi,t(p, a) is well defined.
By feasibility at each node ξ, we get for each j
xi,τ(ξ) 6 Ω(ξ), ϕi,τ(ξ, j) 6 M(ξ, j) and θi,τ(ξ, j) 6 M(ξ, j).
This implies that the sequence (xi,τ(ξ), ϕi,τ(ξ), θi,τ(ξ))τ∈T is uni-
formly bounded. By optimality, the delivery di,τ(ξ, j) is always
lower than the promise V(pτ, ξ, j)ϕi,τ(ξ−, j) and therefore the
sequence (di,τ(ξ))τ∈T is uniformly bounded. Passing to a subse-
quence if necessary, we can assume that for each i, the sequence
(ai,τ)τ∈T converges to a process ai ∈ A.
We claim that (pi, a) is a competitive equilibrium with finite
equivalent payoffs for the economy E. It is straightforward to
check that each plan ai belongs to the budget set Bi(p, q, κ) and
that the feasibility conditions (2.4), (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) are
satisfied. Applying Proposition 4.1, we get that the plan ai has
finite equivalent payoffs. We propose now to prove that ai is
optimal among plans with finite equivalent payoffs, i.e., the set
Prefi(p, ai)∩Bi?(p, q, κ) is empty. Assume by way of contradic-
tion that there exist ε > 0, a plan a in the budget set Bi?(p, q, κ)
and T 1 ∈ N satisfying
∀T > T 1, Πi,T (p, a) > Πi,T (p, ai) + ε. (4.2)
Since ai is physically feasible, we have xi(ξ) 6 Ω(ξ) for every
node ξ ∈ D. It follows from Assumptions (H.2) and (H.3) that
U i(xi) 6 U i(Ω) < +∞. This implies that the limit
Πi(p, ai) ≡ lim
T→∞Π
i,T (p, ai)
exists in [−∞,∞). In particular, there exists T 2 > T 1 such that
∀T > T 2, Πi,T (p, ai) + ε
2
> Πi(p, ai). (4.3)
24We can also adapt the arguments of the proof of Theorem 1 in Araujo,
Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002).
25We refer to the appendix for the precise definition of the truncated economy
Eτ and the associated (finite-horizon) equilibrium concept.
26The process (p, q, κ) belongs to cl Ξ if the condition “p(ξ) ∈ RL++” in (??)
is replaced by “p(ξ) ∈ RL+”.
Since the plan a has finite equivalent payoffs, there exists T >
T 2 and a˜ in the set Bi(p, q, κ) ∩CT such that
a˜1[0,T 2] = a1[0,T 2] and inf
τ>T
[
Πi,τ(p, a˜) − Πi,τ(p, a)
]
> −ε
4
.
We denote by â the plan defined by
∀ξ ∈ D, â(ξ) =
{
a˜(ξ) if t(ξ) 6 T
(0, 0, 0, 0) if t(ξ) > T.
Observe that â belongs to the truncated budget set Bi(p, q, κ) ∩
BT and satisfies
â1[0,T 2] = a1[0,T 2] and Πi,T (p, â) > Πi,T (p, a) − ε4 . (4.4)
Combining (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) we get
Πi,T (p, â) > Πi(p, ai) +
ε
4
.
We let ψi be the correspondence from A to AT defined by
∀a ∈ A, ψi(a) =
{
b ∈ BT : Πi,T (p, b) > Πi(p, a) + ε
4
}
.
Let F i be the correspondence from Ξ × A to AT defined by
∀(pi′, a′) ∈ Ξ × A, F i(pi′, a′) = Bi,T (pi′) ∩ ψi(a′).
Observe that â ∈ F i(pi, ai). Moreover, we proved that there
exists a strictly increasing sequence (Tn)n∈N with Tn ∈ N such
that
lim
n→∞((pn, qn, κn), a
i
n) = ((p, q, κ), a
i)
where
(pn, qn, κn) = (pTn , qTn , κTn ) and ain = a
i,Tn .
Since F i is lower semi-continuous on Ξ× A for product topolo-
gies,27 we can conclude that there exists ν ∈ N large enough
such that Tν > T and the set F i((pν, qν, κν), aiν) is non-empty.
Let âν be an element of that set. This means that
âν ∈ Bi,T (pν, qν, κν) and Πi,T (pν, âν) > Πi(pν, aiν) +
ε
4
.
Since Tν > T , we have
Bi,T (pν, qν, κν) ⊂ Bi,Tν (pν, qν, κν)
and
Πi,Tν (pν, âν) > Πi,T (pν, âν).
It follows that
Πi,Tν (pν, âν) > Πi(pν, aiν) = Π
i,Tν (pν, aiν)
27See Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) for detailed arguments.
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contradicting the optimality of aiν in the truncated economy ETν
under the price process (pν, qν, κν).
We have thus proved that for each i, the plan ai has finite
equivalent payoffs and satisfies
Prefi(p, ai) ∩ Bi?(p, q, κ) = ∅.
This means that ai belongs to the demand set di?(pi). We al-
ready proved that all markets clear. This means that (pi, a) is a
competitive equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs.
Given Proposition 3.3, we can obtain the main existence re-
sult in Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002, Theorem 2)
as a direct corollary of Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.2 (Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002)). If
there is no default penalty then there exists a competitive equi-
librium, i.e., Eq(E) , ∅.
Remark 4.5. The proof of the above result proposed by Araujo,
Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002) is different than ours. They
also consider a sequence of equilibria for truncated economies
and pass to the limit. However, to prove that the limit allocation
is optimal, they follow a rather involved argument showing that
the sequence of marginal utilities of income associated to the
sequence of truncated equilibria is uniformly bounded.
5. Equilibrium refinement
In this section we address an issue related to the indetermi-
nacy of delivery rates in the definition of a competitive equi-
librium. In a companion paper (see Martins-da-Rocha and
Vailakis (2011)) we have shown that for the two examples pro-
posed in Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009), no-trade is a possible equi-
librium outcome. This is due to the fact that the standard equi-
librium concept leaves room for spurious inactivity on asset
markets due to unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliv-
eries. In the definition of a competitive equilibrium, the market
clearing equation defining the delivery rate expected by lenders
leaves its value undeterminate when there is no-trade at equi-
librium. A similar issue was already pointed out by Dubey,
Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005). However, in their model it is
easy to support equilibria with no-trade in the asset markets on
account of absurdly pessimistic expectations about repayment
rates. Indeed, if lenders expect assets to deliver nothing, then
we can support any pure-spot equilibria by choosing the asset
prices to be equal to zero. One may think that this problem
does not arise anymore in the presence of collateral require-
ments since lenders rationally expect deliveries to be at least
larger than the minimum between the promise and the value
of the depreciated collateral. It is true that we cannot support
pure-spot equilibria in a trivial manner as it is the case in Dubey,
Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005). However, spurious inactivity
on asset markets due to overpessimistic expectations is still a
problem even in the presence of collateral requirements. We
propose to clarify this issue and explain how the refinement
proposed by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005) can be
adapted to our setting.
Let (pi, (ai)i∈I) be a competitive equilibrium with finite
equivalent payoffs where pi = (p, q, κ) ∈ Ξ and ai =
(xi, θi, ϕi, di). Fix a node ξ > ξ0. Since agent i delivers in node ξ
at least the amount D(p, ξ, j)ϕi(ξ−, j), we let σi(ξ, j) ∈ [0, 1] be
the individual delivery rate defined by the equation
di(ξ, j) =
[
σi(ξ, j){V(p, ξ, j) − D(p, ξ, j)} + D(p, ξ, j)
]
ϕi(ξ−, j)
if agent i has a short position ϕi(ξ−, j) > 0, and we pose
σi(ξ, j) = 0 elsewhere. If there is trade in node ξ−, i.e.,
ϕi(ξ−, j) > 0 for some agent i, then equation (2.7) in the def-
inition of a competitive equilibrium can be restated as follows
κ(ξ, j)
∑
i∈I
ϕi(ξ−, j) =
∑
i∈I
σi(ξ, j)ϕi(ξ−, j) (5.1)
and κ(ξ, j) can be interpreted as the average delivery rate (per
unit of asset sold) above the minimum delivery D(p, ξ, j). If
there is no-trade in asset j in node ξ− then the delivery rate
κ(ξ, j) is left undeterminate. That is, when the asset is not
traded, our equilibrium concept makes no assumption about the
expected delivery rate. We have shown in Martins-da-Rocha
and Vailakis (2011) that pessimistic expectations about deliv-
eries (i.e., low values of κ(ξ, j)) may by itself render the asset
market inactive if default penalties are large enough. This find-
ing shares some similarities with the issue of trivial equilibria
pointed out by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005). To
explain this link we recall some notations. In Dubey, Geanako-
plos, and Shubik (2005) assets are not collateralized. The re-
payment rate, denoted by K(ξ, j), is defined by the equation
K(ξ, j)V(p, ξ, j)
∑
i∈I
ϕi(ξ−, j) =
∑
i∈I
di(ξ, j).
As explained in Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009), when assets are
collateralized agents deliver at least D(p, ξ, j) per unit of as-
set sold. In this case, if D(p, ξ, j) and V(p, ξ, j) are not
zero, rational agents expect K(ξ, j) to be greater than the ratio
D(p, ξ, j)/V(p, ξ, j), and in particular it must be non-null.28 In
other words, when there is trade in node ξ− we have the relation
K(ξ, j)V(pξ, j) = κ(ξ, j){V(pξ, j) − D(pξ, j)} + D(pξ, j).
In Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005) it is easy to sup-
port equilibria with no-trade in the asset on account of absurdly
pessimistic expectations about repayment rates. However, in
a model with collateral requirements, it is not clear whether
such equilibria can be supported.29 In Martins-da-Rocha and
Vailakis (2011) we show that although agents expect per unit re-
payments K(ξ, j) to be strictly positive (actually above or equal
28This is the reason why in our model we have chosen to parameterize
agents’ expectations about delivery by the average delivery rate above the min-
imum delivery, denoted by κ(ξ, j).
29The intuition behind the existence of trivial equilibria in Dubey, Geanakop-
los, and Shubik (2005) is as follows. Consider a sequence of pure spot markets
and an associated equilibrium. Introduce next an asset j in node ξ−. Choose
the repayment rate K(ξ, j) of the asset equal to zero and the price q(ξ−, j) equal
to zero. Then no agent would have an incentive to trade in node ξ−. In a model
with collateralized obligations this argument breaks down since K(ξ, j) must
be larger that D(p, ξ, j)/V(p, ξ, j). In case the asset’s promise is larger than the
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to the minimum D(p, ξ, j)/V(p, ξ, j)) there is still room for un-
duly pessimistic expectations that sustain equilibrium with no-
trade.
This raises an interesting issue. The equilibrium concept
should be refined in order to rule out such pathological no-trade
equilibria. We show below that the refinement procedure pro-
posed by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005) can be easily
adapted to our framework.
Following Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005) we pro-
pose an equilibrium refinement in which the government in-
tervenes to sell infinitesimal quantities ε > 0 of each asset at
each node and fully delivers on its promises. Since the govern-
ment does not default, it does not need to constitute collateral
bundles. However, since it delivers fully εV(p, ξ, j) but it gets
delivered only εV(κ, p, ξ, j), on net the government injects the
vector of commodities εb(κ, p, ξ, j)v(ξ) where b(κ, p, ξ, j) > 0
is defined by the equation
b(κ, p, ξ, j)p(ξ)v(ξ) = V(p, ξ, j) − V(κ, p, ξ, j).
This touch of honesty banishes whimsical pessimism and rules
out spurious inactivity on asset markets. We adapt the definition
of a competitive equilibrium with the government intervention
proposed by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005) to our
framework.
Definition 5.1. An ε-equilibrium is a family pi = (p, q, κ) ∈ Ξ
of prices and delivery rates and an allocation (ai)i∈I such that:
(1) as in the standard competitive equilibrium with finite equiv-
alent payoffs, for every agent i the plan ai is optimal among
the budget feasible plans and the asset market clears at every
period; (2) different to the standard competitive equilibrium,
commodity markets ε-clear, i.e., for every ξ ∈ D,30∑
i∈I
xi(ξ) =
∑
i∈I
[ωi(ξ) + Y(ξ)xi(ξ−)] + εb(κ, p, ξ, j)v(ξ)
and delivery rates are boosted by the external agent, i.e., for
every ξ > ξ0,
V(κ, p, ξ, j)
ε + ∑
i∈I
θi(ξ−, j)
 = εV(p, ξ, j) + ∑
i∈I
di(ξ, j). (5.2)
Equation (5.2) defining the delivery rate κ(ξ, j) can be re-
stated as follows
κ(ξ, j)
ε + ∑
i∈I
θi(ξ−, j)
 = ε + ∑
i∈I
σi(ξ, j)ϕi(ξ−, j)
depreciated value of the collateral, i.e., D(pξ, j) = p(ξ)Y(ξ, j)C(ξ−, j), one may
try to implement no-trade by choosing κ(ξ, j) = 0 (or equivalently K(ξ, j) =
D(p, ξ, j)/V(p, ξ, j)) and fixing the asset price q(ξ−, j) = p(ξ−)C(ξ−, j). No
agent would have incentives to invest. Indeed, it would be better to buy the
bundle C(ξ−, j) instead of one unit of the asset because of the utility obtained
from consuming the collateral. However, it is not clear whether agents would
have no incentives to sell the asset. It depends on whether the gain from con-
suming the collateral in node ξ can compensate the future penalty suffered in
case of default or the loss in consumption due to the repayment of debt besides
the value of the depreciated collateral.
30By convention we let a−1 = (x−1, θ−1, ϕ−1, d−1) = (0, 0, 0, 0) and
b(κ, p, ξ0, j) = 0.
where σi(ξ, j) is agent i’s individual delivery rate as defined by
(5.1). The delivery rate κ(ξ, j) is the weighted average of indi-
vidual rates and is boosted due to the fact that the government
delivers fully on its promises. As the government intervention
disappears, i.e., ε tends to 0, this boost disappears for periods
where the asset is positively traded in the limit.
Definition 5.2. A competitive equilibrium (pi, (ai)i∈I) with fi-
nite equivalent payoffs is called a refined equilibrium if for
every ε > 0 small enough there exists an ε-equilibrium
(pi(ε), (ai(ε))i∈I) such that
lim
ε→0
(pi(ε), (ai(ε))i∈I) = (pi, (ai)i∈I).
It is straightforward to adapt our arguments to get existence
(under standard assumptions) of an ε-equilibrium with finite
equivalent payoffs. In order to prove that the limit (pi, (ai)i∈I)
is an equilibrium, the only difficulty is to show that the plan
ai is optimal in the budget set defined by the price process pi.
The arguments follow almost verbatim those in the proof of
Theorem 4.1 and are based on the lower semi-continuity of the
correspondence F i.31
6. Conclusion
What makes general equilibrium models with collateral re-
quirements (Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002) and
Kubler and Schmedders (2003)) very appealing is that collateral
constraints not only do exist in actual markets but seem to be
an efficient mechanism to preclude Ponzi schemes without im-
posing any ad-hoc constraint on debt. The recent contributions
of Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) and Ferreira and Torres-Martı´nez
(2010) show that the positive results in Araujo, Pa´scoa, and
Torres-Martı´nez (2002) may not be robust: the effectiveness of
collateral requirements to bound debt may not be valid anymore
in the natural case where there are other mechanisms leading
agents to overpay, that is, to repay more than the collateral when
the value of their debt actually exceeds the collateral value.
To formally close the model and restore equilibrium, we
need to impose borrowing constraints. Among the different
approaches already existing in the literature with full commit-
ment, we argue in favor of the endogenous debt constraints a` la
Levine and Zame (1996). We introduce in the setting of Araujo,
Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders
(2003) and Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of plans with
finite equivalent payoffs. When payments are fully enforced,
our concept of plans with finite equivalent payoffs coincides
31Here we will have
lim
ε→0((p(ε), q(ε), κ(ε)), a
i(ε)) = ((p, q, κ), ai)
instead of
lim
n→N
((pn, qn, κn), ain) = ((p, q, κ), a
i).
Moreover, we will obtain a contradiction with respect to the optimality of ai(ε)
in the boosted ε-economy (for ε small enough) instead of the truncated econ-
omy ET for T large enough.
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with the concept of plans with finitely effective debt introduced
by Levine and Zame (1996). When there are collateral re-
quirements but no default penalties, any budget feasible plan
has automatically finite equivalent payoffs. In particular, our
budget set coincides with the standard one defined in Araujo,
Pa´scoa, and Torres-Martı´nez (2002) and Kubler and Schmed-
ders (2003). Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties,
namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties,
we show that restricting actions to have finite equivalent payoffs
rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees equilibrium existence
while keeping the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we
expect in our model. The proof is very simple and intuitive.
In particular, the main existence result in Araujo, Pa´scoa, and
Torres-Martı´nez (2002) is a direct corollary of our existence re-
sult.
A. Appendix: Truncated economy
Fix τ ∈ T with τ > 0. Recall that Aτ denotes the set of all
plans a ∈ A such that
∀ξ ∈ D, t(ξ) > τ =⇒ a(ξ) = 0.
We let Bτ be the set of plans a ∈ Aτ satisfying the additional
condition
∀ξ ∈ D, t(ξ) = τ =⇒ ϕ(ξ) = 0.
Given a process (p, q, κ) ∈ Ξ, we denote by Bi,τ(p, q, κ) the set
defined by
Bi,τ(p, q, κ) ≡ Bi(p, q, κ) ∩ Bτ.
A competitive equilibrium for the truncated economy Eτ is
a family of prices and delivery rates pi = (p, q, κ) ∈ Ξ and an
allocation a = (ai)i∈I with ai ∈ Bτ such that
(a) for every agent i, the plan ai is optimal, i.e.,32
ai ∈ di,τ(p, q, κ); (A.1)
(b) commodity markets clear at every node up to period τ, i.e.,∑
i∈I
xi(ξ0) =
∑
i∈I
ωi(ξ0) (A.2)
and for all ξ ∈ Dτ \ {ξ0},∑
i∈I
xi(ξ) =
∑
i∈I
[
ωi(ξ) + Y(ξ)xi(ξ−)
]
; (A.3)
(c) asset markets clear at every node up to period τ− 1, i.e., for
all ξ ∈ Dτ−1,∑
i∈I
θi(ξ) =
∑
i∈I
ϕi(ξ); (A.4)
32The demand set is defined by
di,τ(p, q, κ) ≡ argmax{Πi,τ(p, a) : a ∈ Bi,τ(p, q, κ)}.
(d) deliveries match up to period τ, i.e., for all ξ ∈ Dτ \{ξ0} and
all j ∈ J,∑
i∈I
V(κ, p, ξ, j)θi(ξ−, j) =
∑
i∈I
di(ξ, j). (A.5)
Observe that if a plan a belongs to Bτ, then Πi,τ(p, a) and
Πi(p, a) coincide for every price process p. Moreover, if (pi, a)
is a competitive equilibrium for the truncated economy Eτ, then
without any loss of generality, we can assume that q(ξ) = 0 and
θ(ξ) = 0 for every terminal node ξ ∈ Dτ.
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